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This paper seeks to provide a tentative inventory of 
problems subsumed under the term political mobilization 
which is one of the three major themes pursued in the 
European University Institute project on The Future of 
Party Government initiated by Professor Rudolf Wildenmann.
It takes the use of the words "political mobilization" for 
granted, although certain queries have rightly been raised 
about the use of the term "mobilization". Thus one could 
note: the allegation that it has been uncritically trans­
ferred from the literature on totalitarianism to the study 
of open democratic political systems (Sartori ); the ob­
jection raised by Gunnar Sjoblom that it is conceptually 
and grammatically mistaken to speak of a person mobilizing 
him- or herself, instead of being mobilized by others; or 
the view that the term political mobilization should really 
be used only for the process of induction of new groups into
a political system in the processes of mass democratization
2(as analyzed above all by the late Stein Rokkan ).
The concept of political mobilization is treated in three 
companion papers, presented to the June 1982 Conference by 
Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase and Birgitta Nedelmann. For this 
very general paper a few elementary notions should suffice.
We shall conceive political mobilization in terms of linkage 
processes between different elites groups on the one hand, 
and citizens on the other. Action can be taken from either 
side. One of the major, and in a democratic era undoubtedly 
most legitimate, linkages is provided by what is usually 
termed the "partisan-electoral channel" . In systems with 
responsible government, universal suffrage, and open, compe­
titive elections,parties put up candidates and programmes in 
a competitive struggle for representation and office. This 
is held to ensure democratic accountability, and allows citi­




























































































Obviously, parties do not provide the only, exclusive 
channels in the interation between leaders and followers.
There are a host of other intermediate actors, including 
the bureaucracy, organized interest groups, ad hoc action 
groups and the mass media. Both leaders and individual 
citizens can seek to short-cut party by more direct forms 
of contact, as in plebiscitary stances of leaders, or the 
seeking of direct access on the part of citizens. More­
over, neither citizens nor leaders come to their inter­
action tabula rasa. Leaders inevitably have other 
links, i.e. with other parties, and the various other inter­
mediate actors just mentioned. Holding offices also 
demands the fulfillment of specific roles and responsibili­
ties. Citizens, on the other hand, are socialized into 
political life by numerous agencies beyond party, including 
the family, educational institutions, churches, recreational 
associations and the work-place; they are affected by ex­
periences with alternative agencies like the bureaucracy or 
interest groups, and also undergo life-cycle effects.
Yet for reasons of clarity it seems useful to proceed in 
the following analysis in three successive steps:
1. We shall first treat the role of parties as agencies 
of political mobilization in abstracto, assuming that one 
can consider the problem of linkages between parties and 
citizens in isolation from other intermediate agencies.
Section III will explore problems raised in the relation 
between citizen and party (in the singular), Section IV in 
his relation to the party system (or parties in the plural);
2. We shall then consider the role of parties as 
agencies of mobilization, taking into account the interaction 
of parties with other possible agencies of political mobil­




























































































and the bureaucracy. Given that this problem has very 
different aspects, whether one views it from the 
perspective of rulers, or from that of the citizens, 
the analysis will again be split in two sections:
Section V traces the problems from the top downwards, 
and Section VI looks from the citizen upwards;
3. Finally, we shall present a few general propo­
sitions on trends towards a possible displacement of 
parties by other agencies of political mobilization.
But before we go into the analysis, some remarks 
will be made on historical mobilization processes 
(Section II). It might be argued that such a subject 
hardly has a real place in a project which deals with 
The Future of Party Government. Yet, we shall seek to 
show that current analytical approaches, normative dis­
cussions and even political problems have their roots 
in experiences over a much longer time-span than of 
the post-war period alone.
This paper is exploratory in nature. At this stage it 
cannot but show a somewhat uncertain mixture between normative 
concerns (as expressed in the general project on 
The Future of Party Government), analytical statements 
(based on logical and conjectural reasoning), and 





























































































II. PARTIES AND HISTORICAL MOBILIZATION PROCESSES
We tend to regard the development of political parties 
as the natural and inevitable concomitant of mass demo­
cratization processes. Yet, a closer inspection of the 
record reveals that the manner of democratization left a 
legacy which has had an impact on discussions of the role
of parties, as well as on the functioning of parties3themselves, to this day. We shall order our remarks in 
this section along the following themes: the lingering 
impact of anti-party sentiment; the view that parties 
are essentially a transient, because transitional phenome­
non; assumptions that at one time "a golden age of party" 
existed; the impact for better or worse of developmental 
perspectives in the drawing up of typologies in the field 
of party analysis; the Rokkan freezing proposition; and 
the general issue on whether parties are dependent or in­
dependent variables in relation to social changes.
1. Lingering anti-party sentiment
From at least two sides the legitimacy of parties 
has been contested in the period of mass democratization, 
from that of traditionalist-aristocratic doctrines on the 
one hand, and ultra-democratic reasoning on the other. In 
the first perspective there was no place for the lower 
orders of society to tinker with the precious institutions 
of authority. When parties did eventually arise, they were 
at most assigned a highly restricted sphere for political 
action - a view long buttressed by legal doctrines which 
resisted the very idea of a Parteienstaat. A denial of 
party from a very different perspective derived from the 
teachings of Rousseau and his disciples. Starting from 
egalitarian premises, they emphasized the need for imme­
diate and total participation of each individual, not me­
diated by partial associations or delegated representatives. 




























































































compatible with the expression of popular sovereignty in 
a volonté générale. The first (authoritarian) tradition 
and the second (ultrademocratic) tradition are curiously 
married in populist doctrines which emphasize the need to 
tie leaders and followers directly together through ple­
biscitary devices which are not meant to divide political 
society but to cement the bonds between a leader and a 
people postulated to be fundamentally at one.
Clearly, these varied doctrines have been unable to 
stem the growth of parties in all stable, competitive 
democracies. Yet, it is as well to remember that they often 
exert an influence on contemporary "critical" discussions 
of the role of party in modern society.
2. Parties as a transient phenomenon?
A number of authors have argued that parties should 
really be regarded as a historically specific phenomenon 
thrown up by a transition from a mainly "traditional" to a 
more "rational-legal" social order in the Weberian sense. 
Parties were necessary instruments to bring new social 
strata into the political process, so it is argued, but 
once "parochials" have turned into "subjects" and better, 
into "citizens" in the Almond-Verba sense, parties have 
outlived their usefulness. Instead citizens can act direct­
ly in different social groups according to specific issues 
at stake, while simultaneously bureaucratic agencies and 
the legal system allow adequate direct action for specific 
goals in which party may be a hindrance rather than a help.
It is as well to remember that such sentiments were already
4 5voiced by classical authors like Ostrogorski and Michels who 
turned increasingly negative towards the very idea of party, 
and to recognize similarities on the other hand between 
such views and current anti-party sentiment of neo-demo- 
cratic ideologues. A useful subject for study would be to 
probe such similarities, and to investigate to what degree 




























































































ular countries and social groups.
3. Was there ever a 'golden age of party'?
The view that parties were essentially historically- 
specific agencies of initial mass mobilization, allowed 
yet another opinion to grow up which colours many of our 
present-day discussions, i.e. the idea that at one time 
in the history of mass democratization parties could 
rightfully claim to be spokesmen par excellence for clear 
principles and distinct social groups which they organized 
and mobilized in effective social action. Yet, in the very 
act of their achieving success parties could not help being 
corrupted, by the opportunism of office, by a blurring of 
social cleavage-lines which inevitably followed successful 
social integration of their clienteles, by internal bureau­
cratic sclerosis, etc. However, the idea of a "golden age" 
of party is likely to be myth, rather than reality - called forth by post 
hoc idealization more than by a clear inspection of actual records. At a 
minimum, one should again emphasize that the actual role of parties in 
processes of political mobilization and emancipation were very different 
as between parties and countries. In some countries parties 
which predated the processes of mass democracy adapted in 
forms which were often very effective for all their being 
far from heroic (e.g. the US party system in the time of 
machine politics). In yet other cases, universal suffrage 
was imposed from above with the clear intention to inte­
grate voters in the state rather than in parties regarded 
with little sympathy (e.g., in Bismarckian Germany, and in 
a very different manner in a Bonapartist or Gaullist France). 
Again, in countries where parties did play an important role 
in mobilizing new groups into political life, not all par­
ties were equally effective in different time periods, in 
different regions, or in relation to different social groups. 
At least one disadvantage of looking at parties with his- 




























































































gerate the degree of mass participation and mobilization, 
or even the salience of party and party politics, for the 
citizenry at large even in the time of an expanding 
suffrage - a factor which cannot but lead to exaggerated 
and prejudicial views on contemporary developments.
4. Developmental typologies: Duverger and Neumann
Maurice Duverger derived both his distinction between 
cadre parties and mass parties, and that between internally 
and externally created parties, from a developmental 
perspective - relating them to the very different positions 
that notables on the one hand, and lower orders in society
6on the other occupied during the time of mass democratization. 
Duverger posited a contagion from the left: mass parties were 
the result of a successful organizational effort of left-wing 
parties; once such parties had penetrated fully into the 
representative system, the need for competition would force 
other parties willy-nilly to follow suit. The argument is 
not very much different from that of Sigmund Neumann, who 
saw a trend towards evolution from parties of individual re­
presentation into parties of social, or even parties of total 7integration. Paradoxically, there has been very little em­
pirical testing of such assumed developmental "laws" towards 
ever increasing mass organization. But at least since Otto 
Kirchheimer launched his alternative forecast about the in­
evitable development of catch-all parties, prevailing 
reasoning has tended to go into the direction of a relative 
weakening, rather than strengthening of parties as agencies 
of political mobilization. Again, the Kirchheimer proposition
itself has come under fire for being a postulate rather than9an empirical reality. Clearly, we can only solve the problem 
whether such unilinear trends exist or not, by comparative 
analysis of a longitudinal nature.
5. The Rokkan freezing-proposition
If one speaks of the continuing impact of past mobil­
ization processes on present-day politics, the Rokkan- 




























































































example. Rokkan, too, analyzed the establishment of parties 
in Western Europe in terms of successive waves of mobil­
ization of new groups in societies in which the suffrage 
expanded. Once parties had successfully integrated such 
new groups in the political system, party systems froze 
along the alignments which had given rise to them 
initially. As political conversion of voters from one 
party to another is a much more difficult task than the 
encadrement of new arrivals in a political market, party 
systems became relatively stabilized. Rokkan's analytical
approach has been confirmed by a variety of studies (e.g.
11 12 Rose-Urwin; see also Pedersen on Party Lifespans who indi­
cated that the infant mortality of new parties is much 
greater than the death rate of more mature parties). Yet, 
there are a number of caveats. In the first place, different 
systems differ markedly in their aggregate volatility, with
some systems becoming more and others less stable over time , 13 14(see data in Pedersen and Maguire). Secondly, the present 
world of competitive party systems shows a substantial number 
of cases which did have marked regime changes. In some of 
them the party system has indeed changed drastically as com­
pared with earlier periods of history (e.g., post-1949 
Germany, post-1958 France; to a different degree all political 
systems in Southern Europe). Thirdly, recent research suggests 
that once frozen-alignments are thawing increasingly in a
large number of countries, albeit at a very different rate 15(Maguire). Finally, it is one thing to suggest that the 
format and alignments of party systems show considerable con­
tinuity over time - this does not necessarily imply that 
parties within such systems are really a replica of their 
ancestors. Continuity may be the result as much of intelli­
gent adaptation of parties as of a sclerosis of which they 
are sometimes uncritically accused.
6. Parties as dependent or independent variables
The point just made may be generalized. The literature 




























































































opposite conclusions. In one view, parties are above all 
historical-sociological phenomena; being the product of 
past political and social history they are thought to be 
mainly a dependent variable, then as now. In another 
view parties are very much the independent variable.
Thus approaches analyzing party strategies in terms of 
formal models, as well as theories about rational voting, 
assume that both parties and voters are free to move, and 
in that process to determine actual outcomes. It is 
suggested that this apparent dichotomy runs ver^much into 
the danger of being a superficial simplification. Even the 
most frozen of Rokkan's party systems have clearly survived 
only not because they were simply the products of happy 
history, but because their parties showed a remarkable 
capacity to heed - not to say: to meet - new challenges. 
"Stable" party systems have survived major challenges, in­
cluding World Wars, a long depression, a period of recon­
struction and unwonted affluence, sometimes losses of 
colonial empires, new international alliances, processes of 
political integration, and a variety of domestic societal 
changes (see the listing in the Wildenmann project proposal 
which rightly distinguishes between changes in governmental 
systems, societal changes and policy problems, l.c. pp. 7-9). 
Clearly, then, "old" parties have indeed proved a remarkable 
capacity to cope, which is something rather different from 
saying that they are dependent variables only.
On the other hand, the formal theories of parties and 
voting have had to recognize many limitations in practice, 
including ideological positions, inertia and familiarity 
considerations, permissible and non-permissible coalitions, 
policy distances, etc. which all seem to suggest that 
parties are not as "independent" as earlier theories con­
fidently held. In The Future of Party Government project, the 
focus is therefore rightly on the combination of parties as 
being normatively as well as factually independent actors 
having to face new political and societal problems which are 





























































































III. PARTY AND CITIZENS IN ABSTRACTO
We now turn to an analysis of the relation between party 
and citizens, each seen in abstracto without taking into account 
the simultaneous existence of more than one party on the 
one hand, or the presence of alternative agencies of 
political mobilization on the other. Our concern is with 
the relationship of at least the following actors: party 
voters, party members, party militants, and holders of re­
presentative or executive office. We shall group our (inevitably 
eclectic) remarks around four headings: the problem of the 
electoral mandate which is supposed to bind voters, party 
members, party activists and leaders together in one agreed 
party position; the role of party militants; the conflicting 
trends towards party bureaucratization and a new amateur 
politics; and the possible conflict between parties as 
policy-setting and mere plebiscitary agencies.
1. The problem of the electoral mandate
In any discussion about the linkages between elected 
leaders and followers, the problem of what in England is 
called "the electoral mandate" looms large. The specific 
party platform which a party offers in elections, is the 
basis of its electoral legitimation, and it also forms the 
bond between elected representatives and their parties. But 
it is precisely at this point that problems emerge. For 
to whom are elected representatives accountable, to voters 
who choose them, or to party members who nominate them?
To Duverger the problem was inextricably bound up 
with his view about the natural development of parties: 
whereas cadre' parties and internally created parties could 
easily emphasize a trustee concept of representation, mass 
parties and externally created parties inevitably came ^
closer to politico and delegate conceptions of representation. 
As his developmental "laws" lack genuine empirical validation, 




























































































A contrary, equally simple explanation has been put
18forward by Robert McKenzie. In his view, the force of 
parliamentary institutions cannot but shift the centre of 
actual power to the parliamentary leaders of a party, 
whatever the rules of a party say about its internal de­
cision-making processes. His analysis has come under fire19from Labour party critics like Miliband, and seems in­
creasingly unrealistic given contemporary developments of 
the British party system, where power seems to move in­
creasingly towards extra-parliamentary actors, particularly
20in the case of the Labour Party. Yet, explanation 
is complicated by the fact, that not only very different 
situations prevail in different parties, but also in dif­
ferent countries, and that we have very little really 
reliable information about the actual relations between 
elected representatives and extra-parliamentary party 
organs, at any one time, let alone over time.
A realistic analysis of the problem of the electoral 
mandate must begin from a realization, that its importance 
cannot be but relative. Any electoral programme, however 
well prepared, inevitably faces unforeseen circumstances 
which may cause havoc in the best intentions. Also, 
electoral promises find an unavoidable restraint in the 
realities of bureaucratic implementation and the restrict­
ions of available resources. Moreover, whenever parties do 
not gain an independent majority, electoral promises will 
have to be adjusted to conflicting demands of coalition 
partners.
However, such logical relativizations do not really 
solve the dilemma - not least because party militants 
active in extra-parliamentary party organs are not likely 
to be passive spectators when they see an electoral plat­
form for which they may have fought hard, being compromised. 
The dilemma is perhaps most easily illustrated by iuxtaposing 
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In the first model, the emphasis is on the need to preserve 
freedom for elected representatives to act in the parlia­
mentary arena. In the second model, the focus is on the 
contrary on the need for the leaders to remain accountable 
to those who nominated them. Neither model is by itself 
"right"; jointly they illustrate the conflicting cues to 
which political leaders are inevitably exposed. Any real­
istic analysis of political mobilization should therefore 
take the possibility of conflict between leader appeals to 
voters and to party activists into account.
2. Leaders, militants, members and voters
Parties differ greatly, not only in the number of 
their members, but also in the degree of membership activity 
and mobilization. Yet even in parties with a large and re­
latively active membership, true militants form at most a 
relatively small minority. Until the full results of the 
Reif study on Middle-Level Elites are in, we have as yet 
scanty evidence, and even that study will only give us one
time-point in the life of each party covered, centred on one
21particular activity. May's "law" of curvilinearity which 
concludes that activists tend towards relatively extreme 
ideological positions, compared to both leaders and ordinary 
party members and voters, has intuitive appeal and some 
evidence going for it. Yet much more comparative research in 
this area is necessary before unambiguous conclusions may be 
drawn. Assuming the "law" holds, how to explain the May- 
phenomenon? Is it because militants are by definition ex­
clusively oriented towards party, while both leaders and 
ordinary members or voters are subject to greater cross­
pressures? Should explanations be sought in the particular 
milieus and occupations from which activists tend to be re­
cruited, i.e. those who have a relatively great control over 
their working hours, so that they enjoy differential advantage 




























































































employees in social organizations? Or should one rather 
think in terms of different positions and responsibilities, 
allowing for the fact that the ideologues of to-day are 
often aspirants for real power who once they attain their 
goal are likely to develop very different political 
orientations (in a process reminiscent of the Paretian 
theory about a natural circulation of elites, with lions 
turning into foxes)?
Whatever the possible explanation, we again lack 
reliable evidence on whether the role of party activists 
within parties has of late increased, or not. It is 
tempting to reason in terms of a wide-spread effect of the 
sixties, when a new generation (or rather a minority within 
it) was seized by ideological hopes and beliefs, and a 
willingness to resort to new types of political action, 
multiplied in its effect by (passing) media attention 
and (temporary) successes. It is also possible to argue in 
terms of new cleavages becoming salient in political per­
ceptions, e.g.: international preoccupations veering from 
Cold War to North-South conflicts, the susceptibility of 
new affluent groups for post-materialist values; new con­
cerns about the environment; renewed debates about the 
nature of capitalism; or conflicts about armaments and 
peace policies. It is perfectly possible to argue that on 
the one hand the real participation of rank-and-file member 
has declined in numbers and volume, and yet to insist that 
militants within parties have exerted an increasing 
pressure. But again, we have no real data, which must clear 
ly differentiate between different parties and countries to 
be at all realistic.
For a proper view on the role of party militants, we 
should, moreover, have much more information on internal 
party decision-making. We have in fact remarkable little in 
sight on a comparative basis on crucial questions such as: 
who appoints party leaders? How often do party congresses 
meet? What regulations exist on the degree of freedom for 
elected representatives? Who draws up, and decides on, 




























































































candidates offering themselves for election? Who nominates 
parliamentary candidates? What conditions exist for re­
nomination? Do procedures exist for recall? How binding 
are decisions of party congresses? Which groups in the 
party decide on the formation or ending of political 
coalitions? Obviously statutory provisions can tell us 
something about such matters, but if anywhere the gap be­
tween actual behaviour and institutional prescription in 
the field of actual party politics is large indeed.
3. Party bureaucratization or a new amateur politics?
The (as yet scanty) literature on party organization 
and participation suggests two possible trends: on the one 
hand a growing professionalization and bureaucratization of 
party organizations, and an increased role for party-con­
trolled personnel in government employ; and on the other 
hand a new tendency towards selective amateur politics.
The trend towards increased professionalization could 
be illustrated by the following developments:
a. elected representatives are becoming engaged full-time; 
the burden of parliamentary work has become such as to make
a genuine combination with other employment increasingly 
difficult, if not impossible; a similar tendency is now 
also at work at sub-national levels;
b. members of representative bodies tend to receive in­
creased staff support, whether from parliamentary services 
or from increased personal staffs;
c. the number of party-controlled executive positions 
tends to increase, as more "political advisers" are appointed, 
"ministerial cabinets" grow in numbers, advisory agencies 
expand greatly, and more generally there is increasing scope 
for patronage appointments;
d. in many countries there is increasing state financing 
of parties (whether through general grants or specific sub­




























































































training, youth work, etc.)- To the extent that parties 
become less dependent on membership income, this factor 
may cause party elites to be less interested and con­
cerned with membership activities and sensitivities;
e. there is an increased reliance on experts in such 
matters as research, relation to the media, professional 
campaigning, etc.
Until the findings of the Recent Changes-project 
are in, these five points are merely suggestive of 
possible trends. As yet we cannot substantiate two other 
trends suggested by Kirchheimer: the increased role of 
interest group representatives in parliamentary represent­
ation; and the considerably increased entry of former 
civil servants into politics. To the extent that Parlia­
ments are becoming assemblies of organization men, their 
representative role may well become more selective, 
if not biased. Should one argue that politics, even in its 
party-controlled activities, tends to provide greater scope 
for political careers, in that there are more positions 
which demand full-time engagement, and which are increasing 
ly attractive in terms of future prospects, providing a 
relatively open and fast channel for social climbers? If 
so, what do such developments imply for political represent 
ation and continuity?
As against such presumed trends towards increased 
professionalization, there is also an alleged increase in 
amateur politics. Notably the great expansion of the 
tertiary and quarterny sectors has resulted in increased 
numbers of persons who have relatively free control of thei 
own working-time. Leisure time has increased for the 
population generally. But whereas a great majority chooses 
other ways to spend it than politics, certain categories 
are disproportionately represented in party activities: e.g 
students, journalists, university staffs and others engaged 




























































































groups, civil servants, to some degree women and retired 
persons. Some of these categories relate to the political 
process in a rather special manner (i.e., a more ideo­
logical one?). In as far as within-party activities become 
increasingly time-consuming, the role of those who indeed 
can match this development with an investment of their 
own time, may become even more selective. Could one, then, 
argue that internal party politics is increasingly being 
monopolized by a dialogue between the politically-employed 
and those whose employment or freedom from employment 
permit an equal amount of political effort - with the re­
mainder of party members being reduced to spectator roles?
A true validation of such speculations is only possible 
through a close analysis of actual decision-making in 
parties. But some information can be had from other sources: 
e.g., a census of positions appointments to which are clearly 
controlled by party; a careful inventory of the cursus 
honorum of party elites; survey data as provided in the Middle- 
Level Elites-project; analysis of changes in the social 
background of members of Parliament and other representative 
bodies over time, etc.
4. Principles, platforms and plebiscitary stratagems
Parties derive their legitimation in democratic poli­
tics from their unique role of seeking voter approval for 
political programmes offered in elections. In the history 
of many parties, programmes of principles have been major 
documents in political thought and development. In as far 
there is a new upsurge of ideological politics, such pro­
grammes might regain high symbolic importance. The same is 
true for more specific election programmes. Presumably, 
the Manifestoes-project is likely to show a tendency for 
such programmes to increase in length over time, and to 
cover increasingly varied subjects. This is, on the one 
hand, a natural corollary of the widening of state inter­
vention which potentially politicizes an ever-widening 




























































































the part of party to provide a place for sectional groups 
in its midst, as well as outside it (whether of organized 
interest groups, ad hoc action groups, or even simple 
categorical "groups" thought to need attention or wooing).
On the other hand, a variety of forces presses in the 
opposite direction. Thus, Budge and Farlie have argued that 
parties tend to "compete" not on the same issues, but on 
only those issues which they regard as comparatively 
favourable to themselves. Modern electioneering empha­
sizes a clear selectivity of issues, as well as a strong 
personalization of a few, if not one, party leader(s). Also, 
modern politics is often also characterized by a shortening 
of horizons: attention goes out less to long-term policies 
and general principles, than to winning the next election, 
manning particular political offices, settling pressing 
political issues. If this diagnosis is true, it implies that 
there is an inherent conflict between the perspectives of ad 
hoc electioneers and office holders, and party activists who 
have pressed for long statements of principles and platforms 
exactly as a "guarantee" for desired action. It also 
illustrates again the dubious value of the concept of a 
definite "mandate", of which party activists tend to regard 
themselves as the chosen guardians, but which to leaders may 
be no more than tactical ploys or promises.
IV. PARTY SYSTEMS AND CITIZENS IN ABSTRACTO
So far, our review has been carried on, as if one political 
party, complete with its voters, members, militants, and 
leaders in different political roles, existed in isolation 
only. We must now shift our attention to the level of the 
party system, to do justice to the fact that in the actual 
world of politics voters and party leaders are faced with the 
simultaneous existence of more than one party actor. We shall 
divide our quick survey again into four points: the impact of 




























































































interact; the extent to which citizens can use their vote 
to affect the political system in a decisive manner; the 
comparative 'hold' of parties and the party system on the 
voters; and the possible dynamics of the party system 
over time.
1. The debate on the electoral system; constraint or not?
Since many decades two rival views have dominated the 
debate on the impact of electoral systems.^Put succinctly: 
in one view, advocated above all by Hermens and Duverger, 
electoral systems create parties. In his famous indictment 
Hermens attributed to PR ideologization of politics, frag­
mentation of political will, ineffective government, and a 
likely plebiscitary breakthrough of extremist movements. In 
contrast, a single-member plurality system forced a two- 
party system, with moderate parties contesting the middle 
ground between them. Duverger further elaborated on this 
view, by adding a third option in run-off systems also 
causing a gravitation towards the centre, but retaining a
multi-party system. Again such views of the decisive impact25of electoral systems, Rokkan suggested that as a matter of 
actual record it was much more a question of party systems 
creating electoral systems, as parties which had crystallized 
around the time of the advent of universal suffrage, chose 
electoral systems which at a minimum were likely to conso­
lidate their position.
At least two footnotes should be placed in connection26with this debate. Sartori has rightly made a distinction 
between "strong" and "feeble" electoral systems, the first 
forcing a certain organization of electoral forces, and the 
other mainly registrating passively whatever alignments 
and realignments (including possibly split-offs) occur in 
any particular party system. In the second place, there is 
little doubt that electoral reforms introduced after a clear 
discontinuity in political regimes did have a causal effect 




























































































illustrated in post-war Germany where the 5% rule greatly 
assisted the growth of what Wildenmann and others have 
called a 2 1/2-party system. Similarly, institutional re­
forms including the electoral system, but also since 1962 
the institution of a directly-elected President under a 
run-off second ballot system, was to have a large-scale
effect on the eventual restoration and simplification of
27the French party system in the French Fifth Republic.
In fact, the debate on the role of electoral systems has
been renewed in the 1960s and 1970s. On the one hand, the
increased polarization in two-party Britain caused many
British political scientists to challenge the Hermens-
Duverger-Downs assumptions about a natural tendency of two-
28party systems towards centrist government and moderation. On
the other hand, the record of coalition government was clear-
29ly upgraded, not least by Arend Lijphart's vivid challenge
30of the Almond concept of a "continental-European system" 
which did not really fit the case of what Lijphart himself 
was to call consociational democracy systems, and also by a 
more general awareness through studies of European cabinets
that single-party government tended to be a relatively rare
, . , . 31phenomenon in European parliamentary systems.
Such developments have caused a remarkable mirror-game 
among reformist writers. Those familiar with a two-party 
system began to reject what S.E. Finer has called "the ad­
versary model of politics" - witness the eager rush among 
present-day British political scientists, otherwise of very 
different persuasion, to reverse the traditional statement 
that "England does not love coalitions". On the other hand, 
the bi-polar model retains its attraction for reformists in 
multi-party systems. In addition to drawing on Downs' in­
dictment of the basically irrationalist features of multi- 
32party systems, the dated belief in the merit of moderate 
swings of the pendulum, and the new impact of a post- 




























































































also find solace in a simplistic reading of Sartori's 
typologizing of polarized pluralism.
Surely, the confusion and general self-righteous­
ness of such debates make it a matter of urgent priority 
for political scientists and political leaders alike to 
spell out their hidden norms. Or should we really accept 
that one should simultaneously embrace such at first 
sight conflicting criteria as: the wish to have both 
alternation in government and continuity in policy; the 
view that political action should bring out differences and 
bridge cleavages; the desire to honour electoral mandates 
and the recognition that government presupposes the possi­
bility to adjust declared intentions in the light of 
changing circumstances; the wish to retain "liberal" 
elite values and also to honour the sovereign will of the 
mass electorate, and so on?
Turning towards a more mundane level, we now have a 
fair number of studies which give us rather complete inform­
ation on the manner in which votes are translated into seats
33 34(e.g., Wildenmann/Kaltefleiter, Douglas Rae) under different 
institutional arrangements, including the major variable of 
size of district. Less satisfactory, however, is our know­
ledge on how different systems really affect parties and 
voters in the choices they must make. Speculation and 
simulation are all we can go on. But there, again, we are 
likely to run across Rokkan1s argument that parties and voters 
do not act in a pristine world, unaffected by historical de­
velopments, but are in fact very much determined by the 
manner in which party systems grew out of particular 
cleavages, salient at a particular historical period.
2. The effect of voter choice: how decisive?
European parliamentary systems do not offer the same 
degree of voter choice, for reasons both institutional and 




























































































Practically in all countries, voters choose members 
to the Lower House, and to various regional and local re­
presentative bodies. But even on this score countries 
differ in the frequency of elections, as they do also in 
the degree to which the voter can influence the actual com­
position of the Second Chamber. The importance of the 
Second Chamber itself in different systems shows great 
variation, while such a body is absent in some countries.
More important is the issue whether voters have a direct 
say in the election of the Head of State or the Premier - a 
variable which in very different ways has proved of sub­
stantial importance in Weimar Germany, Finland, or post 
1962 France. Yet another difference lies in the extent to 
which systems have allowed referenda (binding or consultative). 
The greater the degree direct voting is allowed, the greater 
the potential challenge for parties. Can and should they seek 
to enter all contests on whatever level? Are referenda a way 
to short-cut parties (in a manner which may not be unwelcome 
to them whenever they are faced with untractable and divisive 
issues?). And to what degree do forms of a direct election 
of supreme executives strengthen a plebiscitary element in 
voter choice, so that parties may be becoming more dependent 
on leaders than leaders on parties?
At the level of the party system, the major variable 
is, of course, the degree to which voters are likely to 
bring about single-party majority governments, or at a more 
modest level, are able to force a substantial change in the 
composition of governments. We do have a somewhat sophisti­
cated terminology to characterize the manner in which govern­
ments can change under the impact of elections, ranging from 
alternation, two-bloc parliamentarism, semi- and peripheral 
turnover, to Proporz-arrangements and Grand Coalitions. We 
also have full inventories of the parliamentary base and
party composition of Cabinets over a long time-span, as well
36as sophisticated theories about coalition-formation. But 
what we do not have is clear and reliable information on a 




























































































arrangements imply for voter perceptions, attitudes and be­
haviour, let alone the general legitimacy of different de­
mocratic political systems. In that sense, the generally 
wide gap existing between scholars interested in institut­
ions and overall political configurations of political 
systems on the one hand, and specialists on voting behaviour 
on the other, is regrettable and should be bridged.
One study we do have, which throws some light on the 
relation between voters and governments, is the study of 
Rose and Mackie prepared within the Recent Changes-project 
on whether incumbency in government pays or no^ "Common 
sense" confidently suggests two opposite conclusions. On the 
one hand, it is argued, that each government is bound to take 
unpopular decisions, and eventually to alienate some of its 
supporters; one would therefore expect government parties 
not to do well in elections. On the other hand, there is the 
assumption that governments work in the glare of publicity, 
that they can manipulate the economy once election time 
approaches, that they can choose a moment for elections 
which to them seems favourable (at least in those systems 
which permit such tactical dissolutions); from such proposi­
tions one would expect government parties to do well. In 
fact, Rose and Mackie show that the available evidence does 
not permit either conclusion - the electoral record of 
governments being too chequered. One overriding difficulty 
is, of course, that in many cases coalition governments fall 
apart at election time, with each participating party going 
its own way. The Rose-Mackie data suggest that coalition 
parties suffer rather different electoral fortunes, some 
winning and some loosing. At a minimum, this greatly compli­
cates a systematic analysis, because one should then be able 
to explain why voters for parties in one common coalition do 
react so differently.
3. The "hold" of party systems
The general debate on The Future of Party Government is 




























































































of a weakening of the hold of parties on the loyalties, 
sympathies, or even simple interest of ordinary voters.
Reliable statements on actual trends can only be made 
by studies of developments over time in single countries, 
and comparative studies between them. Certain attempts to 
do so have been made in the Recent Changes-project, using 
both aggregate and survey data. Many data must still be 
analyzed and reported in a comparative perspective, pos­
sibly in the planned volume on Political Mobilization.
Among the indicators desired are:
A. Aggregate data
1. data on turn-out (as assembled by Dittrich and 
38Johansen). A first inspection of overtime graphs hardly con­
firms a clear relation between the size of turnout and a pre­
sumed well- or malfunctioning of particular systems (let 
alone, that there are rival propositions which would see in 
low turnout and which would see in high turnout a reason for 
concern).
2. data on aggregate electoral volatility (as collected
39by Mogens N. Pedersen). Here again, trends are far from clear,
because widely differing between countries over time. At the
same time, however, different studies by Pedersen, Maguire,
Borre, Mayer and others do suggest an increased aggregate40mobility in the 1970s in most European countries.
3. data on traditional system parties versus new
parties. Such data could provide a relatively easy indicator,
at least for systems which traditionally had clearly-marked
system parties. But to my knowledge no conclusive data have
, . 41yet come out on a comparative basis.
4. data on political fragmentation. The Rae-index has
been widely used, and also severely criticized (e.g., Pedersen, 
42Sartori). Different authors have collected over-time data on 
a comparative basis; their studies again show substantial 
differences between countries, and not one linear, but a 




























































































Wolinetz and Ersson-Lane ) .
5. membership trends. An overtime study by Stefano
44Bartolini is now available for all Socialist parties. 
Comparable analyses for other parties meet with considerable 
difficulty, not least because of unclear membership criteria 
and the greater difficulty of comparing non-Socialist 
parties across countries. The Recent Changes-project tends 
to prove that there is no such thing as a universal and 
massive decline of party memberships (although there have 
been drastic changes for some countries, and/or some parties).
B. Survey data
Both the wide spread of electoral surveys (often
modelled in one form or another on the Michigan model), and
45extensive comparative projects like the Verba-Nie-Kim and
46the Eight-Nation studies, allow close scrutiny on a compara­
tive basis on a variety of data relevant for the study of 
mobilization. It will be a major goal of the project to 
probe available data for suitable measures, e.g. on individual 
volatility, party identification, political competence, 
political cynicism, and allegiance and legitimacy generally. 
But at least one major problem is that we are unlikely to 
find longitudinal data of sufficient sophistication to allow 
diagnoses of systemic import.
4. The possible dynamics of party systems
There have been only few attempts to chart possible 
regularities in the dynamics of party systems. We have the 
long-standing assumption about a natural swing of the 
pendulum for two-party systems (and possibly also for what 
Sartori calls moderate pluralist systems?). Duverger once 
constructed, on the basis of his interpretation of French 
experience, a "law" about a natural slide of parties to­
wards the right, with new parties springing up on the left 
to fill the vacuum left by such movement. By far the most 




























































































however. Even then we must realize that Sartori spoke only
of mechanical dispositions, rather than actual "laws". A
major point at issue is the degree to which (oolarized)
48party systems are subject to centrifugation or not. More 
generally, there is a rarely made explicit view about the 
importance of a "center" in party systems, and the extent
to which the existence of one or more center parties is
49likely to make for centripetal or centrifugal drives. Yet, 
is there not a curious discrepancy between the large number 
of elections which provide a considerable body of data for 
analysis, the flourishing of a large body of abstract 
coalition theories, and the only very limited literature 
on the actual dynamics of European party systems, informed 
by both substantive knowledge of the party configurations 
of countries concerned and the high analytical skills of 
an author like Sartori, or Downs? More systematic work 
along their line, in the light of actual over-time develop­
ments of European party systems, should have a high priori 





























































































V. PARTIES, CITIZENS AND OTHER INTERMEDIATE AGENTS
Whereas in sections III and IV we dealt with the relation 
between party, c.q. the party system on the one hand and 
citizens on the other, as if these relations existed in 
vacuo, we must now turn to a consideration of both parties 
and citizens in relation to other intermediate agencies. We speak of 
"intermediate", because here, too, we conceive of mobili­
zation processes as providing vertical links between the 
ultimate, legitimate decision-makers at the top, and the 
ordinary citizen at the bottom. A proper analysis will take 
these two different perspectives: from the top downwards 
(Section V), from the bottom upwards (Section VI), duly into 
account. We shall assume as one major hypothesis that in all 
countries there is a general process of increasing social 
differentiation, leading to a greater assortment of linkages 
as well as to a multiplication of sites of decision-making.
1. Parties and group mobilization
In an ideal-type party of social integration as des­
cribed by Sigmund Neumann, parties direct themselves to 
specific social groups, which they seek to mobilize and in­
corporate in the life of the party. The characteristic form 
of organization is the ancillary association, which under 
party auspices seeks to meet the interests of specific 
categories of citizens: women, youth, trade unionists, those 
in search of specific forms of recreation, like sports, 
singing or other music, etc. Parties also try to strengthen 
their hold on communications media, by not only providing 
specialized party information bulletins, but by seeking to 
control general newspapers and if at all possible, also 
radio and television. In the same way, parties have engaged 
in insurance activities, in elaborate education programmes, 
and more generally as brokers in obtaining specific govern­
ment services. As we said earlier, there are many indications 
that such closed worlds are breaking down, as specific party- 




























































































pete with more specialized media in an increasingly mobile 
and open society. But here again, one must sound a word of 
warning before too general a conclusion is drawn. For 
countries and parties again differ greatly, with forms of 
party "colonization" being much stronger and persistent 
in some countries (Italy, Austria, Ireland, Finland?) than 
in others.
Assuming such closed networks of party-controlled 
organizations are weakening, or even disappearing, what 
does this mean? Does it imply an over-all weakening of 
parties, as they become less socially "rooted" and have 
fewer dependable resources for mobilization? Or should one 
argue, that it also frees parties from historically- 
transient "ghetto positions", which could threaten their 
very existence in a period of new issues and concerns?
2. Parties and formal interest groups
The relation of parties to major interest groups re­
presents one aspect of the general problem just mentioned.
In a Neumann-type party of social integration, but paradox­
ically also in the Kirchheimer-type of "catch-all" party, 
stress is laid on the reciprocal advantages of network 
relations between parties and major interest groups. Again, 
we have little systematic, longitudinal information on this 
point - let alone that we are in a clear position to state 
who is "colonizing" whom, and what possible changes may 
have taken place in such forms of interaction. Certain over­
time data can be derived from systematic studies of changes 
in the composition of parliamentary personnel; at one time- 
point, the Middle-Level Elites project will conceivably 
offer cross-country and cross-party information. Yet, at 
first sight, one might venture the hypothesis that many im­
portant interest groups are finding party a less important 
actor with whom and through whom to work than are ministers 




























































































3. Parties and "action groups"
Self-styled advocates of the "New Politics" of action 
groups have adduced two patently false arguments to account
for the salience of new political groups in the 1960s and
501970s. One false argument is that they are a new phenomenon, 
as if the history of social mobilization is not replete with 
examples of action groups in addition to parties (which in 
certain cases even originated in the forms of looser volun­
tary societies - note as one example the emphasis on the 
"counter-cultural" or "peripheral" protest movements in the 
mobilization of the Old Left in Scandinavia). A second false 
argument is the presumed closed, oligarchical nature of many 
existing political parties, as if their history does not 
reveal an exceedingly low threshold for the successful entry 
of conscious minority groups. A number of recent studies 
have pointed out, that many activists in action groups are 
also disproportionately active within parties, often to the 
regret of existing power holders and believers in the merit 
of institutionalized politics generally. Whereas some party 
politicians have sought to embrace action groups warmly ("to 
remain in touch with the young", "to take note of the issues 
which clearly mobilize new groups", or even simply "to be 
with it"), there is little evidence that such tactics have 
durably strengthened parties organizationally or electorally. 
For parties face at a minimum two dilemmas: they must 
aggregate as well as articulate, and given the often extreme 
positions of forces demanding to be "articulated", the task 
of aggregation is neither easy, nor lasting, nor always electorally 
rewarding; and given the low cost-benefit ratios for minority 
groups engaged in flamboyant actions, for as long as they 
obtain privilaged access to the political agenda, they are 
not likely to forfeit such benefits for the sake of party 
loyalties or convenience. Clearly, the relations between 
parties and (many) ad hoc action groups is therefore likely 
to be a thorny one, as compared towards links with more 
established and stable interest groups, let alone the ancillary 




























































































4. Parties and mass media
The subject of this paragraph is one of the most 
complicated ones, not least because the heading covers a 
variety of possible relationships. On the most general 
level, there is the social impact of changes in the modern 
communications system, including not only the ever-in­
creasing variety of printed publications, but above all 
radio and television. On a somewhat lower level of ab­
straction, there is the issue what the effects of modern 
media developments are on the life of parties, both in 
their external presentation and their internal functioning. 
And finally, there is the more mundane matter of the extent 
of actual party control over the various media and their 
content. The subject is sufficiently complicated to demand 
treatment in the future Political Mobilization volume by an 
acknowledged expert.
The Recent Changes-project will provide basic inform­
ation on the extent to which parties have held on, or lost, 
their control over specific media (dailies, radio and tele­
vision) . On the basis of impressionistic evidence, parties 
would seem to have been unable to retain the control they 
once may have had over parts of the daily press: post-war 
history is replete with financial failures of one-time strong 
Socialist and other Weltanschauung-newspapers. Control over 
radio and television offers a much more varied picture, with 
situations differing greatly between countries. But even 
here, the competition from alternative broadcasts seems to 
have seriously weakened the force of such controls as parties 
may have maintained or established. As compared to earlier 
times, few must be the groups which are still exposed mainly 
to a closed communications network (if ever they were).
As for the second problem, of the impact of the media 
on the external and internal relations of parties, again 
speculation must take over where concrete, detailed studies 
fail. One could submit the following three conjectures:




























































































tendency to personalize top leaders, to give greater scope 
to the manipulation of issues in a selective manner, and 
to engage above all in short-term tactical politics.
Second, the natural tendency to regard conflict rather 
than consensus as news is likely to be to some degree a 
self-fulfilling prophesy, as ardent minorities seek media 
attention for particularist goals. Third, the general 
distraction which modern mass media provide, may unfavour­
ably affect participation by rank-and-file members, thus 
eroding many of the characteristics which a parti de masse 
was traditionally (and probably ideally) thought to repre­
sent. To the extent this is true, this factor strengthens 
the role of select groups of activists in the manner analyzed 
earlier in this paper.
(For a sophisticated attempt to relate media developments as 
one major variable in changes occurring in party systems to 
some other crucial ones, in the light of concerns about 
political accountability, see Sjoblom.^
5. Parties and bureaucracies
In view of the joint weight of parties and bureaucracies 
on actual decision-making, this relationship is probably the 
most crucial one. From the point of view of party leaders, the 
functioning of bureaucracies poses at least three challenges: 
a. parties must be able to ensure effective political control 
and democratic accountability; b. control over the bureaucracy 
can be a valuable resource, for the elaboration of specific 
services; c. the bureaucracy, like other agents mentioned 
earlier, provides an alternative linkage mechanism between 
government at the top and citizens at the bottom. Seen from 
the point of individual citizens, the bureaucracy is one major 
part of "government", which to them is not always easily dis­
tinguished from parties in control. Empirical study (in the52Verba-Nie tradition) have emphasized direct contacting of 




























































































systems. The degree of satisfaction with bureaucratic 
responses can therefore be a major factor in the creation 
and maintenance of legitimacy, from which paradoxically 
also individual parties, the party system and the consti­
tutional order generally can profit.
Yet, the very term bureaucracy covers in fact an 
ever widening number of offices, authorities and apparatuses, 
which are split more and more along functional as well as 
regional lines. Both absolutely, and relatively in relation 
to all other actors, the "weight" of different bureaucracies 
in relation to other political actors must have increased 
most in the post-war world.
In the actual relation between parties and bureau­
cracies, one major variable, of continuing importance, con­
sists of past state-building and nation-building processes. 
There is a world of difference between countries in which 
these processes developed largely without the prior or 
simultaneous establishment of powerful bureaucratic struc­
tures, and those in which such structures did play an indispens­
able, or at least relatively powerful, role. In countries 
with a consociational tradition, or one in which centrali­
zation was as much the result of judicial, aristocratic 
and representative processes (as in England), bureaucracies 
developed late and generally fell in easily with the 
assumptions of accountability to legitimate political author­
ities. A very different situation prevailed in countries like 
France, or Prussia, or in yet another manner Italy where the 
bureaucracy remained in many ways a corpus alienum super­
imposed on a highly localized society. To the extent, that 
bureaucracies live out of pre- or non-democratic traditions, 
the problem of partisan control and political accountability 
is a much greater one than elsewhere.
At the same time, the processes of wide-spread diversi­
fication cannot but make havoc with earlier assumptions about 
one homogeneous bureaucracy, as presupposed in such different 




























































































or the French Haute Administration. A true analysis of 
actual relations between parties and bureaucratic agencies 
must go beyond a general statement about relations existing 
at the top echelons of government, to lower levels both 
along regional and functional lines. In either case very 
different relations may prevail, with also rather different 
party actors being concerned. (Is not Italy a major 
illustration of this case, as the system does not depend, 
as so often argued, on the control over the central govern­
ment by the DC-cum-minor-partners alone, but also on at 
least four subordinate levels of government, not to speak 
of the remaining sottogoverno, in which often other parties 
have a very real share?).
One might hypothesize that in toto the role of bureau­
cratic agencies and individual bureaucrats has substantially 
grown as compared with those in the partisan-electoral 
channel. One might also point to the very substantial role 
that bureaucrats rather than politicians play in what are 
often too easily and generically called corporate channels.
One could then suggest that parties have to some extent 
tried to "compensate" by a variety of devices to strengthen 
control over and above their formal powers in government and 
parliament: e.g., by the multiplication of ministerial per­
sonnel; by the addition of political advisers, by a strength­
ening of parliamentary staffs, by the formation in some 
countries of ever more numerous ministerial cabinets, by con­
scious political appointments in established bureaucratic 
positions, by setting up new bodies outside normal hierarchi­
cal official channels, etc.
To the extent that such posited developments do indeed 
occur, it is a moot point whether they indeed strengthen 
party as an institution or not. Of old patronage has served 
to cement certain loyalties. But at the same time, diversifi­
cation at the political level mirrors that on the bureaucratic 
level. Party may be a necessary channel for coveted appoint­
ments. But once arrived, political appointees need not neces­




























































































VI. CITIZENS, PARTIES AND ALTERNATIVE AGENCIES OF MOBILIZATION
1. Citizens,_active or not?
So far we have focused on the interaction between 
political actors, who are by definition active in some form 
or other: top elites, party militants, interest groups, 
action groups, the media, bureaucrats. When we now direct our 
attention to the citizens, activity cannot be taken for 
granted, as indeed the very concept of political mobilization 
suggests. In fact, there is the very fundamental issue 
whether citizens should always be active. On the one 
hand, there is the widespread assumption that citizen activity 
is by nature a "good". Is the history of democratic develop­
ment not written in terms of the activation of ever new strata 
in political decision-making? Do we not have the whole weight 
of the participatory democracy literature, even since Rousseau, 
resting on us? Is not equality of participation a must, for 
the citizen and the system both - because the equalities of 
input, the fairness of the political agenda, and of the 
"authoritative allocation of values" depend on citizen activi­
ty? Yet, it is as well to remember that there is also a wide-
53spread counter-literature: fears from Mill to Kornhauser 
about a "mass society"; the proposition ever since the study
on The Authoritarian Personality that lower class entry might---------------------------------  54 55
hazard liberal elite values (e.g. Berelson, Lipset); the
traumatic experiences of enforced political mobilization by
totalitarian regimes, etc.
At a minimum therefore there is a fundamental problem 
of the amount or degree of political mobilization which a 
political system can sustain, the nature of demands, the 
methods used - problems rightly posed by different models of 
politics, as one can note on the stress on gate-keeping and 
support in systems theory, on the danger of overload in 
communications approaches, on the need for adequate institu­
tionalization if political system is not to fall into 




























































































This implies no less than that our subject raises
issues which at the more fundamental level of analysis
brings the entire armory of empirical democratic theory into
play: e.g., discussions of pluralism, in developmental and
contemporary perspectives, the Eckstein-theory on congruency56of authority patterns, the entire literature on political 
legitimacy. And the same holds true, on only a slightly less 
general level, for the literature on political socialization, 
participation, the voting literature, empirical studies of 
political legitimacy, and so forth and so on.
2. The potential for action
The literature on historical mobilization in Western 
democracies provides some data and more general speculations 
on the circumstances under which citizens act - or perhaps on 
a more general level on how people change from parochials and 
subjects to citizens in the Almond-Verba sense. Handbooks 
with time-series data provide a number of relevant social 
indicators. For our contemporary understanding the most 
important data are undoubtedly in the Eight-Nation studies, 
which have made the problem of dispositions to act, and to 
act in different manner, the core of their theoretical and 
empirical concerns.
3. The modes of action
The Project can draw on what is by now a large-scale 
debate on the modes of political participation. In view of 
the Project's specific concerns about the role of party in 
political participation, the Verba-Nie-Kim analysis with 
its emphasis on at least four independent dimensions of 
participation: voting, party and campaigning activities, 
communal action, and direct contacting - which are theore­
tically and empirically distinct - would seem immediately 
relevant. While confirming a strong bias in participation 
by the higher-educated, higher social status and higher in­




























































































the type of issue or kind of political action required. Such 
findings must be weighed in the light on the findings of the 
Eight-Nation study, and possibly different research results 
on the basis of additional survey research questions, nota­
bly on the independence of a separate protest dimension in 
addition to the four singled out by Verba c.s. Also of great 
importance is the general conclusion by Verba c.s. that well- 
institutionalized forms of social organization (as provided 
by strong parties, interest groups and bureaucratic agencies)
can do much to redress the inequalities of participation as
57far as actual policy outputs are concerned.
4. The channels used
Survey evidence reveals again and again that voting 
and direct contacting of administrative agencies are the most 
wide-spread kinds of citizen actions. On the other hand, real 
participation in parties is low, by whatever measure taken - 
even though party membership figures in relation to party 
voting reveal very substantial different situations, accord­
ing to country or party. Measures of constancy of voting for 
the same party, and of party identification, can tell us 
something further on the degree to which parties are salient 
for individual citizens; to the degree that reliable longi­
tudinal data are available we can form some impression on 
the degree of hold of parties on citizens.
"Groups" are much more immediately manifest to citizens 
than are parties. All citizens experience the influence of 
various primary groups, which the literature on political 
socialization and voting have singled out as being of the ut­
most important. Many citizens are members of associations, 
some of which are deliberately, some only incidentally 
politically active. The Verba-Nie-Kim studies have attempted 
to inventorize to what extent leaders and citizens perceive 
different groups as being actually politically relevant.
Even if citizens do not, the presence of such groups, as well 
as their presence in them, have a substantial importance for 




























































































We have earlier discussed the interaction between 
parties and action groups, and challenged the stereotyped 
view that citizens "must" turn towards the latter, because 
parties are insufficiently open and responsive. Verba c.s. 
did, of course, find communal action to be a relatively 
independent dimension from party activities. Yet one should 
remember that what we conceive above all as action groups 
represent only a small degree of the wide range of 
spontaneous citizen activities studied by Verba c.s.. 
Especially, when our focus is on the most visible, most 
directly "political" type of action groups, we should em­
phasize that participation in them is highly skewed towards 
particular, higher-educated groups in society, who are also 
disproportionately active in parties. We have also data on 
some countries on the degree of legitimacy accorded to 
action groups, and to different modes of protest behaviour. 
Such data will need close study, if we are to have a clear 
view of the relative legitimacy accorded to different kinds 
of institutionalized actors (including party) as against 
less-structured ones. Just as we should not a priori regard 
parties and action groups as alternative modes of political 
action, so we should also not confuse all types of ad hoc 
actions with protest behaviour.
5. Mobilization and policies
The Project aims to spend a major part of its attention 
on the role of parties in policy-making. From the perspective 
of the citizen some substantial problems arise. Although 
individual citizens may mobilize on behalf of particular 
policies, much the larger part of policies devised or im­
plemented are not the result of any obvious behaviour on 
their part. In voting, citizens may have a correct or very 
incorrect view on actual responsibilities for policies they 
might wish to reward or penalize. Citizens may or may not 
have particular views about how effective alternative 




























































































The current debate on whether voters vote in the light of
their own economic prospects, or their view on how those58in power handle economic policy, or neither, should be a 
reminder that the feedback of policies on citizen attitudes 
and behaviour may be very different from what policy-makers 
expect. Again, there is substantial evidence from the 
Eurobarometer studies that many citizens are becoming more 
satisfied with their own situation, as the outlook for the 
future darkens. Clearly, levels of expectation exert a 
powerful independent role on the extent to which people are 
likely to hold politicians really accountable for policies, 
or their absence. What these short remarks simply re-affirm, 
is the urgent need to relate findings from survey research 
on citizen perspectives and attitudes to the policy outputs 
and the general functioning of political systems, over time 
and across countries.
VII. PARTIES AND OTHER LINKAGE ACTORS: DISPLACEMENT OR 
CHANGING ROLES?
1. The dangers of evolutionary reasoning
In the very term The Future of Party Government there is 
more than a hint that parties may be on their way out, along 
a foredoomed trajectory. Quite apart from the fact that the 
findings of the project are not in, it is as well to remember 
at least the following points made in earlier sections:
a. It is too readily assumed, without much evidence, that 
there was a golden age of party which is now being moaned. 
Should one not, at a minimum, take into account that different 
countries had very different degrees of party government in the 
past?
b. Similarly, there is substantial evidence that parties in 
different countries have, if anything, been strengthened in 
the last quarter of a century or so. Both in France and in 
Germany, parties have made an impressive comeback, and parties 





























































































c. There is considerable danger in reasoning in zero-sum 
terms. Even when other intermediate actors increase in im­
portance, it does not necessarily follow that such develop­
ments go to the detriment of party, let alone that power is 
actually taken away from them. In as far as the overall role 
of government increases, one should allow for the possibili­
ty that all actors, including parties, play an increasingly 
important role.
d. It may well be that the role of parties increases in 
some areas, while it decreases in other. One cannot really 
speak of "the" power of parties, without specifying power in 
relation to what or whom.
2. Some tentative generalizations
With that very substantial proviso, one might suggest 
that the following developments affect, at a minimum, the 
role of parties:
a. there is a clear increase in the number of groups - both 
institutionalized and non-institutionalized ones. Most of these 
operate independently in the political arena, in that they 
attempt to influence other political actors directly - as much as 
they may, or may not, seek to influence party;
b. the number of arena's for political decision-making 
has increased, notably in connection with what had been 
called "sectoral" politics;
c. the media play probably an increased role in articulating 
political demands, as well as in the manner in which demands 
are being articulated. Parties seek to adjust to this fact as 
much as some other political actors, yet the immediacy of news­
paper attention gives relatively small groups new opportunities 
for direct approaches to power holders, without the intermediate 
channel of party;
d. there is an increased element of plebiscitary politics - 
both in the exposure of particular leaders, as in recourse
to referenda and opinion polls. Leaders and voters are therefore, 




























































































without regular control from procedural party politics;
e. the complexities of modern government increase the 
need to call on experts - a development which parties cannot 
balance fully by building up party research bureaus, in­
creasing the number of parliamentary staffs at the disposal 
of party, or attempts to mobilize friendly experts;
f. the increased mass of routinized decision-making, 
whether in bureaucratic agencies, or in relatively closed 
circuits of a semi-corporatist nature, inevitably escapes 
party control, while its aggregate effect may yet limit the 
freedom of parties to set priorities, as old commitments 
and sectoral politics dominate over new demands;
g. there is also a tendency for other actors to play an 
increasing role in political decision-making: one should note 
the role of the Judiciary and Central Banks;
h. international decision-making exerts an increasing 
influence, which even a more intense movement towards the 
building up of party cooperation across frontiers than 
exists at present, cannot hope to control;
i. given the possible weakening of party as the major 
agency in articulation and actual policy decisions, their 
main importance could well be in leadership selection and 
the long-term formulation of policy perspectives. These 
tasks put heavy demands on internal party mechanisms, which 
do not seem to be very well suited to them for the present. 
However, they are at least clearly within the uncontested 
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